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Abstract
This article investigates the political attempts to frame European climate politics and provides a critical discourse analysis
of the European Green Deal. A rapid transition towards low-carbon development across the world has been contested
by discourses aiming to acknowledge the inseparability of social and ecological issues. These discussions are fairly new
in the European context and in 2019, the European Commission presented its Communication on the European Green
Deal—the European Union’s legislative roadmap to carbon neutrality by 2050. Empirical evidence for this article is derived
from process tracing and policy analysis of the European Commission’s documents on the European Green Deal in relation
to existing Green New Deals. Drawing from a neo-Gramscian perspective we argue that the European Green Deal is an
attempt to extend the neoliberal hegemonic formation within European climate politics. This results in the foreclosure
of democratic channels for articulating climate politics according to dissenting discourses, thereby avoiding the political
contestation inherent to climate politics.
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1. Introduction
On the 11th of December 2019, the European Commis-
sion communicated to the European Parliament and the
Council, a document called the European Green Deal
(EGD). The EGD played a key role in the approval of
the Von der Leyen Commission and its political agenda
(Gaventa, 2019). It occupied center stage as the most
lobbied topic in Brussels during the first 100 days of
Von der Leyen’s term (Kergueno, 2020). The EGD is
presented as a “growth strategy that aims to trans-
form the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a
modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy”
with zero emissions by 2050 (European Commission,
2019b, p. 2). The EGD further imagines decoupling
economic growth from resource inputs, a goal that is
contested by several academics (European Commission,
2019b; Jackson, 2017; Kallis, Demaria, & D’Alisa, 2015).
The EGD also cites the Commission’s commitment to a
just, inclusive, and people-centered transition (European
Commission, 2019b).
Several studies show that transitions are deeply polit-
ical and involve considering the power relations and
vested interests within energy systems (Haas, 2019;
Kraushaar-Friesen & Busch, 2020), examining the impact
of deploying renewables and gas infrastructure to grow
industrial output and consumption (Guðmundsdóttir,
Carton, Busch, & Ramasar, 2018), scrutinizing ownership
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 8–16 8
of themeans to produce renewable energywith its inher-
ent hegemonic struggles (Haas, 2019; Islar, 2012), and
understanding the disproportionate responsibility of the
polity in driving climate change (Kartha, Kemp-Benedict,
Ghosh, Nazareth, & Gore, 2020; Lindt et al., 2017).
Moreover, social resistance to sustainability agendas
highlights the importance of recognizing the socioeco-
nomic impacts of green transitions and the gap between
the concerns of workers’ struggles to meet the ‘end of
the month’ versus the climate community’s demand of
avoiding the ‘end of the world’ (Martin & Islar, 2020).
Green New Deals (GNDs), in this context, offer an alter-
native to mitigating climate change through “egalitarian
policies that prioritize public goals over corporate profits”
and targeting investments in vulnerable, marginalized,
and frontline communities (Aronoff, Battistoni, Cohen, &
Riofrancos, 2019, p. 14).
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)
published a set of key principles and guidelines that
they recommend should be integrated into a future EGD
to accurately capture the social impact of decarboniza-
tion. Trade unions also have asked the Commission
to be formally included at all stages of the decision-
making, policy implementation, and evaluation phases at
European, national, sectoral, and regional levels (ETUC,
2020). Within this context, this article aims to contribute
to a deeper understanding of the EGD in relation to exist-
ing GNDs by discussing if the European proposal provides
possibilities and newopportunities tomove beyond busi-
ness as usual in the sphere of European climate politics.
We argue that there is a need to explore the political fron-
tiers that the Commission draws between reform and
radical change to understand what is left out of the EGD,
and the implications of such exclusions for the sustain-
able future of Europe. Empirical evidence for this article
is derived from process tracing and policy analysis of the
Commission’s documents related to the EGD as well as
a recent literature review on the GNDs in Europe and
North America.
The article starts with neo-Gramscian perspectives
on politicization. An explanation of the process trac-
ing used for analyzing the EGD follows. Then, we con-
tinue with a brief contextualization of GNDs in Europe
and North America in Section 4. In Section 5, we apply
a process-tracing analysis and compare these develop-
ments with the EGD. In Section 6, we conclude by dis-
cussing the political frontiers of the EGD that define the
core elements of European climate and energy (in)action.
2. Neoliberal Hegemonic Formation and Sustainability
Critical political theorists argue that current demo-
cratic politics have entered into a post-political chapter
because the political, or the constitutive character of
antagonism in human societies, is overlooked (Mouffe,
2005). By means of depoliticization, issues or people are
excluded from democratic debates (Swyngedouw, 2013).
Mouffe (2005) argues that depoliticization operates by
drawing political frontiers while simultaneously denying
their political character. Those excluded from these polit-
ically drawn boundaries are not considered as legitimate
political adversaries. Rather, they are considered igno-
rant, uneducated, unmodern, and irrelevant. As a result,
democratic institutions are weakened (Mouffe, 2005)
and simultaneously the hegemonic framework is further
tightened (Kraushaar-Friesen, 2019; Laclau & Mouffe,
1985). In environmental politics, a post-political condi-
tion may be manifested in the sense that “the articu-
lation of divergent, conflicting, and alternative trajecto-
ries of future environmental possibilities” is forestalled
(Swyngedouw, 2013, p. 5).
Hegemony plays a central role in understanding
post-political theory. Gramsci developed the concept of
hegemony to describe the cultural, economic, political,
and ideological domination of a socioeconomic class by
means of both consent and coercion (Gramsci, 1999).
Neo-Gramscian approaches affirm hegemony as a type
of political relation that presupposes that the social
cannot be totalized or fixed because of the plurality of
“political and social spaces which do not refer to any ulti-
mate unitarian basis” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 126).
Therefore, hegemonic formations arise from articulating
these political and social spaces according to a domi-
nant discourse. In this context, the Gramscian concept
of a war of position offers an analytical path to under-
stand how hegemonic formations operate. Stegemann
and Ossewaarde (2018) argue that the war of position
refers to the strategic integration of counter-hegemonic
positions into the hegemonic discourse. Floating signi-
fiers, discursive elementswith emptymeaning and there-
fore contested in different political spaces, serve tomake
chains of equivalent meaning that allow a discursively
logical incorporation (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). This dis-
cursive operation attempts to totalize meanings that
were previously contested and therefore draws a fron-
tier outside of which alternative meanings lie. When
the incorporation is discursively achieved, the hege-
monic formation is extended. This ‘resulting myth’ estab-
lishes a post-political condition while the political, antag-
onistic character of the counter-hegemonic position is
neglected (Stegemann & Ossewaarde, 2018).
Since the late 20th century, a neoliberal hegemonic
formation has been steadily asserted over different
political spaces. Neoliberalism can be considered as a
‘process’ instead of as an all-encompassing ideology with
clear and demarcated end-states (Heynen & Robbins,
2005). The term neoliberalization has been used by Peck
and Tickell (2002) to emphasize the process-based, varie-
gated character of contemporary processes of economic
and political restructuring. To be more specific, their
approach stresses the insight that neoliberal reforms are
built on uneven institutional landscapes. These differ-
ent landscapes can intensify reform processes or homog-
enize regulatory practices. It is therefore important to
understand that contemporary neoliberal restructuring
reforms take place, and are part of, ongoing transfor-
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mations of already existing regulations and systems in
particular places and at particular times. This varie-
gated approach emphasizes nationally or locally adapted
neoliberal practices linked to the global system.
3. Analytical Framework
Process tracing can help with understanding how the
discursive formation of neoliberalism is advanced in
the EGD. Commonly used in qualitative social science
research, process tracing is defined by its ambition
to study causal mechanisms and causal relationships
between independent variables and outcomes (Beach
& Pederson, 2013). We define the causal mechanism
in question to be Mouffe’s (2005) depoliticization and
use process tracing to test this theorized causal mecha-
nism.Mouffe postulates that the post-political is brought
about by the drawing of political frontiers, followed by
the subsequent exclusion of people or issues that suf-
ficiently denies any political character or legitimacy of
counter-hegemonic ideas. The methodological use of
theory-testing process-tracing from Beach and Pederson
(2013) is explained in Figure 1 with an example from
the EGD’s focus on transportation. At the empirical, case-
specific level, we start by identifying a political fron-
tier in the Commission’s goal of reducing transporta-
tion emissions by 90%. Through the process of exclu-
sion, this goal excludes questions about the underly-
ing factors that shape people’s needs for travel in the
first place. Such matters and their representatives are
then excluded from any decision-making or goal setting.
The Commission fails to ask why people must travel,
either for working, living, etc., and deny the political
nature of problems in relation to living and working
locally. Through the process of neoliberalization, the
Commission sets to achieve their goal of reducing trans-
port emissions by developing and using alternative trans-
port fuels, thus entering the post-political. The process
tracing behind the analysis in Section 5 is explained by
Figure 1 and is used to explicate the remaining environ-
mental and social issues in the EGD.
4. Green New Deals: Narratives for Climate Change
Mitigation
In the study of brief histories of GNDs,Mastini, Kallis, and
Hickel (2021) reveal that little attention has been given to
the fact that the content and framing of GNDs over the
years has shifted. In what they refer to as ‘GND 1.0,’ an
ecological modernization frame focused on investments
in technological solutions is dominant. This frame is char-
acterized as a technocratic exercise that seeks to revital-
ize capitalist investments by channeling financial means
towards research and development, mild subsidies, and
pricing carbon (Mastini et al., 2021). The ‘GND 1.0’ nar-
rative in this sense can be tied to a neoliberal approach
to climate politics insofar as it promotes market-friendly
regulation, buttressing markets, and enabling resource
mobilization and capital accumulation. Nevertheless, a
different frame in GND proposals has emerged repre-
senting openness towards alternatives to the neolib-
eral approach.
The ‘GND 2.0,’ as coined by Mastini et al. (2021),
originated in the aftermath of the G20 growth-friendly
fiscal consolidation in 2010 where 16 of the G20 states
failed to follow UNEP’s 2009 recommendation of spend-
ing a mere 1% of GDP on green initiatives. The ‘GND 2.0’
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Figure 1. Author-created theory-testing process-tracing of depoliticization based on Beach and Pederson (2013).
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policy instruments” that construct our present ecolog-
ical meltdown as a market failure to be fixed through
pricing, rather than inseparable from, and a part of, a
social crisis that can only be addressed by redistributing
economic and political power (“A bold new plan,” 2019;
Mastini et al., 2021, p. 3). Thus, the ‘GND 2.0’ embraces
command-and-control environmental regulation and pri-
oritizes decarbonization at speed, scale, and scope by
using the power of public investment and coordination
(Aronoff et al., 2019), while also seeing itself as part of
grass-roots movement building (Mastini et al., 2021).
‘GND 2.0’ is embedded in recent GND proposals.
In the U.S., Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
led the introduction of House Resolution 109 (hereafter
H. Res. 109) in the House of Representatives in early
2019 (Recognizing the duty of the Federal Government
to create a Green New Deal, 2019). H. Res. 109 is a
non-binding resolution or essentially a list of goals and
not full-blown legislation. More concrete policies have
yet to be drafted in order to require the government to
make any changes or implement any steps towards mit-
igating the country’s climate impacts or adapting to the
impending climate changes. H. Res. 109 declares the duty
of the U.S. government to create a GND to: (a) achieve
net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and
just transition for all communities and workers; (b) cre-
ate millions of good, high-wage jobs and ensure pros-
perity and economic security for all; (c) invest in the
infrastructure and industry to sustainably meet the chal-
lenges of the 21st century; (d) secure clean air and water,
climate and community resiliency, healthy food, access
to nature, and a sustainable environment for all; and
(e) promote justice and equity by stopping current, pre-
venting future, and repairing historic oppression of front-
line and vulnerable communities—defined as indige-
nous peoples, communities of color, migrant commu-
nities, deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural
communities, the poor, low-income workers, women,
the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities, and
youth. H. Res 109 is an important step towards expand-
ing previously drawn political frontiers because it opens
channels to counter-hegemonic discourses.
Another frame in recent GNDs is the ‘GND without
growth.’ As opposed to the GND proposal H. Res. 109,
the ‘GND without growth’ is not contained in one sin-
gle document. It is attributed to the ideas of degrowth
academics, mostly North American and European, and
other movements such as the Democracy in Europe
Movement 2025. The latter published the report called
Blueprint for Europe’s Just Transition containing a differ-
ent GND for Europe (Democracy in Europe Movement
2025, 2019). The report presents a set of proposals for
socioeconomic, legislative, and institutional transforma-
tion while abandoning the dogma of GDP growth as the
primary measure of progress. The recommended alter-
natives include increased public investment, democrati-
zation of the energy sector, a job guarantee, universal
access to public services, resource caps, and environmen-
tal justice measures for resource-providing communities
(Adler, Wargan, & Prakash, 2019; Mastini et al., 2021).
There are points of convergence and tensions
between the GND H. Res. 109 and the ‘GND with-
out growth.’ Kallis, Paulson, D’Alisa, and Demaria (2020,
p. 68) argue that both proposals share the commitment
to a rapid and massive deployment of renewables, the
decarbonization of transport and agriculture, new or
refurbished zero-carbon affordable housing, and refor-
estation and ecological restoration. Both also embrace
social ownership of essential infrastructures and access
to financial instruments like loans and subsidies for a
more democratic control over the economy (Eskelinen,
2015; Marois, 2017). Furthermore, the idea of a just
transition is mobilized in both narratives to point out
the importance of co-creation of policies by involving
labor unions and other stakeholders (Newell &Mulvaney,
2013). Another point of convergence is the expansion
of the welfare state, which involves de-commodifying
essential services such as healthcare, housing and work;
thus, placing themwithin the realmof social rights rather
than privileges allocated by the market (Gough, 2017;
Mastini et al., 2021). Last but not least, both share a
commitment to environmental justice as both explicitly
address the need to give voice to communities rich in
energy resources and to fairly distribute the costs and
benefits of energy extraction (Kallis et al., 2020).
The gap between these GND proposals presents
several points of contention. Some of these tensions con-
cern the use of technology in the expansion of renew-
ables through the costs and risks they can entail (Kallis
et al., 2020). Instead of technology dependence, a ‘GND
without growth’ calls for a fundamental transforma-
tion in the way we think about energy to reduce our
dependence and increase redundancy with renewables.
Another tension lies in the realm of employment and
the just transition. Whereas the ideas which inspired
the GND H. Res. 109, like those proposed by Rhiana
Gunn-Wright at the New Consensus think tank, aims for
guaranteed work and a family-sustaining wage, a ‘GND
without growth’ would rather focus onmore progressive
employment measures aimed at work time reduction
andwork sharing (Kallis et al., 2020), a worker-controlled
production system (Barca, 2019), and embracing gratuity
on top of the universality of basic services (Kallis et al.,
2020; Mastini et al., 2021). Though the New Economics
Foundation, originally part of the visionary group to
propose a GND in 2008 for the U.K., now supports a
four-day work week and higher wages. Furthermore,
the ‘GND without growth’ implies that public finance
arrangements do not require growing the economy as a
whole (Kallis et al., 2020).
Finally, amore substantial but not necessarily irrecon-
cilable tension between these GNDs is identified in terms
of the political frontiers they draw along the lines of the
structural change and their underlying values and ide-
ology (Mastini et al., 2021). This tension addresses two
different points. First, while the ‘GND without growth’
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expands the realm of possibility by challenging capital-
ism and its incompatibility for degrowth, the ‘GND 2.0’
aims at reforming capitalism from the inside. Second,
the ‘GND 1.0”s emphasis on top-down, state-conducted
action and the ‘GND 2.0”s call for bottom-up, prefig-
urative, grass-roots politics will not be easily resolved
(Mastini et al., 2021, p. 7). This dilemma calls for further
conversations about climate politics that recognize that
neitherwaiting for neoliberal capitalism to end nor allow-
ing for new cycles of green primitive accumulation and
commodification of nature are acceptable (McCarthy,
2015; Pollin, 2018). In this sense, the tensions can be
loosened by noting that GNDs may be worth fighting
for. They may be the most promising political opportu-
nity available for movements defending socio-ecological
struggles, such as those under the degrowth umbrella,
to include their struggles on the battlefield of climate
politics (Heron, 2019; Riofrancos, 2019). We will use the
above analysis comparing ‘GND 1.0,’ ‘GND 2.0,’ and ‘GND
without growth’ as a reference point to analyze the EGD
so that we can situate the EGD in the spectrum between
reform and radical change.
5. Analysis for the European Green Deal
In the following sections, we share the results of our
process-tracing and policy analysis on the European
Commission’s communication documents on the EGD.
The Commission begins the EGD by defining it, first and
foremost, as a growth strategy. In the introductory sec-
tion, the Commission states that the aim of the EGD
is to transform Europe into a fair and prosperous soci-
ety: One that is competitive, where economic growth
is decoupled from resource use, while tackling climate
and environment-related challenges. The latter goal is
even promoted to the category of being the present gen-
eration’s “defining task” (European Commission, 2019b,
p. 2). However, addressing climate and environmental
challenges is not a new policy objective as much as the
Commission defines it as this generation’s defining task.
For instance, decoupling economic activity from environ-
mental harmhas beenpart of the Commission’s discourse
at least throughout the entire 21st century (European
Commission, 2001, 2014, 2018, 2019a, 2019b).
As in the case of the GNDs examined above, we
find points of convergence and tension arising between
them and the EGD. To begin with the convergence
points, and in line with the ‘GND 2.0’ narrative, the
Commission shows a clear intention to exercise more
stringent top-down climate governance. It promotes
strengthening its command-and-control powers over the
climate ambition of Member States. Complementarily, it
also embraces increasing the level of climate ambition
of the EU’s transition to net-zero emissions targets for
both 2030 and 2050. In contrast, showing more resem-
blance to a ‘GND 1.0’ narrative, the Commission also
makes a plea for technological advancement to play a
central role by stating that “climate and resource fron-
trunners” are needed “to develop the first commercial
applications of breakthrough technologies in key indus-
trial sectors by 2030,” suggesting carbon-removal tech-
nology like BECCS are a top priority for the EGD agenda
(European Commission, 2019b, p. 8).
The commitment to a rapid and massive deploy-
ment of renewables is another point where the EGD
and the contemporary GNDs converge. The Commission
affirms that decarbonizing the energy sector “is crit-
ical” (European Commission, 2019b, p. 6). It focuses
specifically on the deployment of renewables while
scantly addressing fossil fuels, implying that fossil gases
will not necessarily be outlawed. The deployment of
renewables explicitly promoted is the increase of off-
shore wind power and decarbonized gas. In this decar-
bonization strategy, market-based mechanisms occupy
a central role, where trust for an energy transition is
mostly placed on the competitiveness of renewables.
Furthermore, energy efficiency, as opposed to a reduc-
tion in total energy use, is prioritized. Moreover, there
is reason to doubt that energy-intensive industries will
be adequately addressed and regulated within the EGD.
So, whereas the EGD’s aim of deploying renewables con-
verges with the GNDs, the strategy may give rise to ten-
sions between them given that the EGD’s decarboniza-
tion strategy looks more like the ‘GND 1.0’ technocratic
exercise of large-scale green investment and R&D.
The decarbonization of transport and agriculture is
yet another pointwhere the EGDand theGNDdiscourses
converge. The Commission promises a 90% reduction
in transport emissions by 2050 by boosting multimodal
transport (European Commission, 2019b). Furthermore,
the Commission insists that transport “become drasti-
cally less polluting, especially in cities,” for which a “com-
bination of measures should address emissions, urban
congestion, and improved public transport” (European
Commission, 2019b, p. 11). However, at the strategy level
tensions rise once again. There is little to nodirection pro-
vided on how to improve public transport as the decar-
bonization of transport for the Commission focuses on
alternative transport fuels, such as sustainable aviation
fuels. One potentially radical point is made when declar-
ing that the price of transport should reflect the cost to
the environment and human health, but the document
has a limited scope for following through with a com-
mitment or indication of implementing a tax accurately
reflecting the true cost of carbon (European Commission,
2019b). The 2011 White Paper for Transport set the EU’s
goal for reduction of transport emissions to 60% of 1990
levels by 2050 (European Commission, 2011). While the
EGD increases this goal, the level of detail about how this
goal can be achieved is not clearer than before. Similarly,
in the EGD’s ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy, tensions arise at the
strategy level as the Commission takes a reformist stance
focusing on “feeding a fast-growing population” by tak-
ing advantage of the opportunities opened by “new tech-
nologies and scientific discoveries,” while stimulating
sustainable food consumption (European Commission,
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2019b, p. 11). The EGD ensures Member States’ national
strategic plans for agriculture reflect the ambition set out
in theGND and ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy, indicating a desire
to achieve goals and declarations of intentions but no
real commitment or consequence for not meeting con-
crete, assessable indicators. Lastly, the EGD tasks the EU
with developing “new innovative techniques” to protect
crops from pests and diseases while ensuring sustain-
ability of the system when decades-old approaches such
as permaculture, no-till farming, or crop rotation are
already-proven methods for sustainable land and crop
management (European Commission, 2019b, p. 12).
There are additional convergence points between
the EGD and the transformationist GND narratives.
The EGD contains a strategy for housing as it promotes
a ‘renovation wave’ of old buildings to make them more
energy efficient, something also advocated for in the
GND H. Res. 109. Reforestation and ecological restora-
tion are featured in the EGD through different strate-
gies to address biodiversity loss, forest degradation, and
exploited fisheries, which are alsomentioned in the GND
H. Res. 109’s aim to restore ecosystems and carbon sinks.
The EGD attempts to empower citizens by, for example,
embracing energy communities and strengthening envi-
ronmental education, but the only real place for input
and participation from citizens is through already exist-
ing citizen dialogues and assemblies. This demonstrates
that the EGD recognizes social ownership of essential
infrastructures in this transition, though the document
lacks concrete strategies to allow for citizen input on the
totality of initiatives proposed in the EGD and the chance
for these initiatives to be viable or significant in the soci-
etal transition.
There are also outright tensions between the EGD
and the GNDs. To begin with, the role of labor unions at
the negotiation table is unclear, as it is never mentioned
in the EGD. In the ETUC position paper on the EGD, there
are proposals spanning many of the different initiatives
that have followed the EGD such as the Climate Law, the
Just Transition Fund, the Climate Pact, and the Circular
Economy Plan. The ETUC points out that even though
social partners are mentioned among the stakeholders,
“We [ETUC] regret that no more attention is given to the
role of trade unions and social dialogue to tackle climate
change, especially at the company level” (ETUC, 2020,
p. 5). Chief among ETUC’s proposals is linking climate tar-
gets with robust social requirements, financing the tran-
sition through fair taxation and a bigger portion of the
EU budget, a Just Transition Fund that ensures solidarity,
a stronger focus on employment in the industrial strat-
egy, and an update placing the EGD within the context
of the Covid-19 pandemic (ETUC, 2020). In addition to
ETUC’s proposals, despite the GND H. Res. 109’s explicit
aims for high or decent wages for all, the EGD makes no
such claim. Neither does it refer to working hours, work-
ing weeks, or worker-controlled production systems, as
does the ‘GND without growth’ specifically. Importantly,
the ETUC claims the percentages mentioned in the EGD
“do not tell the whole story and that a target does not
make a policy,” indicating a call for a more viable doc-
ument from the Commission detailing the means and
mechanisms trade unions and others will have available
to achieve the goals set out in the EGD (ETUC, 2020, p. 4).
A major friction between the EGD and the ‘GND 2.0,’
H. Res. 109, as well as the ‘GND without growth’ is
in the realm of job security and essential services. Job
security is not provided through use of a job guaran-
tee, but rather through a financial strategy to re-skill
or re-train workers from declining, carbon-intense indus-
tries and placement in ‘new’ economic sectors, which
are not clearly defined (European Commission, 2019b).
Though the GND H. Res. 109 is not a commitment from
the U.S. government, but rather a goal, it does explicitly
mention a job guarantee and the narrative could align
with more radical strategies like work hour reduction or
job sharing. Again, we see the EGD lacking in content
and specificity with the absence of healthcare. Though
it advocates for healthy food and a healthy environment,
the only support of public health in the EGD is promised
to come from the savings of building efficiencymeasures
(European Commission, 2019b). Energy poverty is men-
tioned as an issue and building renovations given as the
only solution, though no concrete strategy such as ensur-
ing universality of access to energy is presented. Here the
tension between the necessity to de-commodify essen-
tial services, as embraced by the transformationist GND
narratives, and the opportunity to boost the economy
in the EGD is at its clearest. While the GNDs utilize a
momentous opportunity to progress the welfare state
by de-commodifying and re-socializing public goods, the
EGD strategy instead points them towards the market as
a catchall solution.
Another evident tension is the differences in address-
ing environmental justice. The GND narratives are very
clear by recognizing the risks of past, present, and future
injustices suffered by frontline and vulnerable commu-
nities, as well as resource-rich countries, and the need
to distribute the costs and benefits of the transition
fairly. However, the EGD emphasizes the importance of
‘green deal diplomacy’ to promote and implement cli-
mate, environment, and energy policy across the world,
keeping the door open for the EU to force other coun-
tries to follow suit, perhaps. However, this ‘green deal
diplomacy’ pays little attention to the social and environ-
mental injustices caused by the EU’s resource and energy
dependency on other parts of the world. In fact, the
Commission reverts to a rather colonial attitude in the
EGD by stating its intent to “work with global partners to
ensure the EU’s resource security and reliable access to
strategic raw materials” (European Commission, 2019b,
p. 22). Moreover, although the EGD contains a pollution
strategy to protect citizens, there is little to no recogni-
tion of frontline and vulnerable communities or a fair dis-
tribution scheme of the costs and benefits of the pollu-
tion strategy, indicating a further side-lining and silenc-
ing of disadvantaged individuals and communities.
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The financial arrangements reveal yet another ten-
sion between the EGDand theGNDnarratives. The EGD is
concernedwithmainstreaming sustainability by “sending
the right price signals” to achieve what the Commission
calls sustainable and inclusive growth (European Commis-
sion, 2019b, p. 17). Furthermore, the Commission plans
to “mobilize international investors” to allow the EU to
“remain at the forefront of efforts to set up a financial sys-
tem that supports global sustainable growth” (European
Commission, 2019b, p. 22). The first tension in the finan-
cial plans lies in the EGD’s plan of ‘righting’ the price sig-
nals, which clearly follows a market-based approach to
climate politics, similar to that of the ‘GND 1.0’ narrative
as characterized by Mastini et al. (2021). The second ten-
sion is more specific to the EGD as a growth strategy, for
Europe and the world, in contrast with the ‘GND without
growth’ narrative that proposes moving beyond financial
requirements to grow the economy.
A final, broader tension between the EGD and the
GND narratives consists in what Mastini et al. (2021)
described as the degree of structural change involved.
The EGD shows a Commission that is in some instances
fully trapped by the older ‘GND 1.0’ form of climate pol-
itics. The clearest examples of this entrapment are at
the level of financial arrangements and environmental
justice, where both strategy and discourse resemble the
old more than the new form of climate politics. In other
instances, instead, we see a changed Commission in
word, to the extent that it utilizes the discourses of the
newer ‘GND 2.0,’ but not in action, demonstrated by
the proposed modifying of old policy strategies in the
case of energy, transport, agriculture, and job security.
Yet in other instances, the EGD fully embraces the new
‘GND 2.0’ narrative, such as is the case for housing reno-
vation and ecological restoration.
What does this mean for the degree of structural
change possible for the EU? The EGD reflects a con-
tinuation of previous policies for different sectors but
increases goals andmeasures of these policies to a cross-
sectoral level and introduces a common package for a
green transition. In this sense, little structural change is
expected from the EGD, which makes the methods of
the ‘GND 2.0’ narratives unlikely to be used by the EU.
In comparison to the ‘GND 2.0’ narratives, some of which
attempt to embrace economic redistribution, the EGD
does not allow such sites of struggle to open in climate
politics. Rather, the EGD looks more like an attempt to
re-define floating signifiers relevant to climate politics
such as ‘sustainability,’ the meaning of which is even con-
tested in the ‘GND 2.0’ narratives. In this way, chains of
equivalence are permitted to exist between climate pol-
itics and the neoliberal hegemonic formation.
6. Concluding Remarks: Political Frontiers of the
European Green Deal
The GND narratives accurately sketch how the deeply
political aspect of climate politics is denied. On the one
hand, the ‘GND 1.0’ narrative articulates climate politics
according to the discourse of the neoliberal hegemonic
formation. The object of climate politics according to
this narrative is strictly addressing emissions and energy
sources, while its political subject is humankind. On the
other hand, the ‘GND 2.0’ narratives articulate the issues
at stake in the sphere of climate politics according to a
counter-hegemonic discourse where broader social con-
cerns are inseparable from the ecological. The object of
climate politics according to this narrative goes beyond
the technical and involves addressing the socio-cultural
and economic behaviors and institutional arrangements
that drive or allow the rise of emissions in the first
place. Such behaviors and arrangements, not distributed
equally throughout humankind, constitute not only one
political subject in the sphere of climate politics, but a
plurality of subjects that are more or less responsible for
the ecological crisis.
In the case of the EGD, the technocratic exercise
that Mastini et al. (2021) refer to is reflected in the
Commission’s approach to climate politics strictly as a
matter of emissions and energy sources. Except for those
few instances in which the ‘GND 2.0’ narrative is fully
adopted in the EGD, the Commission either remains
trapped in the ‘GND 1.0’ narrative or tries to articu-
late climate politics using a ‘GND 2.0’ discourse without
fully incorporating the necessary changes in terms of the
object and the political subjects of climate politics.
Theoretically speaking, we can say that most of the
time the Commission depoliticizes climate politics in
the EGD by further articulating it strictly in terms of
the neoliberal hegemonic formation, or by materializ-
ing a war of position in which the neoliberal hegemonic
formation attempts to discursively incorporate counter-
hegemonic narratives. In either case, the antagonism or
the political contestation inherent to climate politics is
eliminated, foreclosing democratic channels to counter-
hegemonic articulations of climate politics. The result
is that the EGD might only serve as a justification for
EU Member States to delay implementing transforma-
tive climate policies and therefore perpetuate socioe-
conomic behaviors and institutional arrangements that
are overly responsible for the climate crisis. The politi-
cal frontiers of the EGD, and the tragedy of European
current climate politics is, to paraphrase Gramsci, that
the old climate politics are dying and the new cannot
be born.
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